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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
tary separation. Whether the separation or the length of separation has
been denied or not, it must be proved before the divorce will be grant-
ed. Gibbons v. Gibbons, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1214, 54 S. W. 710. Further-
more the separation must be mutually voluntary. Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 53 Wis. 153, 10 N. W. 166. But if the circumstances surrounding
the original separation are such as to indicate mutual desire for the
separation it will be presumed that the intention continued in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary. Phillips v. Phillips, 22 Wis. 256. The
separation, however, must be shown to have been voluntary in its in-
ception (Sanders v. Sanders, 135 Wis. 613, 116 N. W. 176) and
throughout the statutory period required (Williams v. Williams, 122
Wis. 27, 99 N. W. 431 ; Sanders v. Sanders, supra). In this latter case
the court held that clippings to the effect that "woman kills self to
avoid divorce suit" and letters of the same kind, were more liable to
annoy than to effect a reconciliation and that consequently there was
nothing to show a lack of mutual desire for separation. When the wife
is forced to leave because of cruel treatment, although she left of her
own accord, such a separation is not considered voluntary. Jakubke v.
Jakubke, 125 Wis. 635, 104 N. W. 704. Likewise if one party has be-
come insane and has been placed in an asylum there is no voluntary
separation. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 428; Lee v. Lee, 182
N. C. 61, 108 S. E. 352. L. M: S.. '26.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - ORDINANCES - DELEGA-
TION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.-Ex Parte Cavanaugh
v. Gerk, Chief of Police, City of St. Louis. Missouri Supreme
Court, en banc, White, J. (about March 30, 1926). No. 26,936.
This case tested the validity of ordinances 32846 and 23926 of
the Code of the City of St. Louis. The first ordinance established the
Traffic Council; the second enumerated its powers and provided that its
regulations should constitute emergency law for a certain period, the
permanence of such regulations being dependent on ratification by the
Board of Aldermen. The Traffic Council was given power to pass
iules establishing one-way streets, erecting traffic signals, permitting
angle parking, etc., but the ordinances did not provide the conditions
under which these rules were to be passed. An extract of ordinance
23926, sec. (b) follows:
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"The rules and regulations established by the traffic council-
shall be published in the City Journal, and upon their publication
therein they shall become effective and shall govern the regulation
of traffic for a period of ninety days after date of publication,
within which time there shall be introduced in the Board of Alder-
men a bill embodying such rules and regulations, and such rules
and regulations shall continue in full force and effect during such
time as such bill shall be pending in the Board of Aldermen."
The petitioner was arrested for disregarding two regulations
passed by the council eighty-nine days prior to the violation. How-
ever, no bill had been introduced in or passed by the Board of Alder-
men sanctioning these regulations.
The petitioner contended that the traffic council had no right
to promulgate traffic rules, nor to determine territory to which they
should apply, as such power was legislative, to be exercised by the
Board of Aldermen, and not subject to be delegated to an administra-
tive body like the traffic council.
Held: The City of St. Louis possesses legislative power, derived
directly from its charter. (Haeussler Inv. Co. v. Bates, 267 S. W. 637.)
A legislative body cannot delegate its authority, but alone must exer-
cise its legislative functions. (12 C. J. 859; 6 R. C. L. 175.) However,
it can empower a board to determine facts as to whetlier a rule should
be applied, but in this case there is an attempt to do more, therefore,
the ordinances are unconstitutional. (Merchants Exchange of St. Louis
v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616; Hayes v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516; City of
St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248.) The court said that these cases
directly applied to the one in question. The Board of Aldermen gave
the Traffic Council absolute power to determine the territory and the
regulation to be applied regardless of any conditions; therefore, they
attempted to delegate their legislative power.
"If the Board, in creating the council, had designated the terri-
tory in which the council might operate and enforce its regulations, by
some general description as to population, or business occupation, or
amount of traffic, and had left it to the council to determine the facts
as to what particular territory came within the general provisions, the
ordinances would have been constitutional." (From Judge White's
opinion.)
C. L. W., '26.Petitioner discharged.
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